A Role-based Access Control (RBAC) mechanism prevents unauthorized users to perform an operation, according to authorization policies which are defined on the user's role within an enterprise. Several models have been proposed to specify complex RBAC policies. However, existing approaches for policy enforcement do not fully support all the types of policies that can be expressed in these models, which hinders their adoption among practitioners.
INTRODUCTION
Access control (AC) systems have been used to restrict a user to access critical resources within an enterprise. One of the most used AC models is Role-based Access Control (RBAC), which allows a user to access a resource or to perform an operation based on her role, e.g., her job position within an enterprise. The first RBAC model (RBAC96 [43] ) defines (authorization) policies by mapping each user to a set of roles and each role to a set of permissions; a permission is defined as an abstraction of a set of operations that can be performed on a set of objects, i.e., resources. Therefore, a user is allowed to perform only the operations of the permissions associated with her role. Several proposals have extended RBAC96 to support new types of policies, such as delegation [18, 46, 54, 56] and contextual [3, 9, 10, 28, 42] . In addition to extended RBAC models, several policy languages have been proposed to ease the specification of complex RBAC policies on top of these models. In this paper we consider our recent proposal of an RBAC model, called GemRBAC+CTX [6, 8] , which has been designed to be very expressive, by seamlessly integrating the various types of authorization policies surveyed in the literature and classified in a taxonomy [6] . To the best of our knowledge, the Gem-RBAC+CTX model is the only one supporting all the policies types classified in [6] (prerequisite [2, 43] , cardinality [1] , precedence and dependency [44] , role hierarchy [43] , separation of duty (SoD) [45] , binding of duty (BoD) [48] , delegation and revocation [18, 54] , contextual [10, 28] ) and their different facets. Moreover, GemR-BAC+CTX is paired with a high-level policy specification language, GemRBAC-DSL [7] , to encourage its adoption among practitioners. We formalized the policies supported by GemRBAC+CTX as OCL (Object Constraint Language [39] ) constraints [6, 8] , to enable their operationalization. Following a model-driven approach, we defined the semantics of GemRBAC-DSL by mapping the language constructs to the OCL constraints presented in [6, 8] .
A big gap between the definition of new, richer RBAC models and languages and their adoption in practice is the availability of an enforcement mechanism: the latter is a component that receives a user access request (hereafter referred to as "AC request") at run time and makes an access decision (allow/deny) based on the policies configured for a system. The lack of enforcement mechanisms for more expressive RBAC models has favored the adoption on a large scale [38] of the standard RBAC96 model, which is, however, the least expressive model. For instance, one of our industrial partnersdeveloping communication solutions for manipulating sensitive data in critical situations such as natural disasters or wars-needs to specify and enforce complex policies that involve the user's context (space and time), the history of operations performed by the user, and role delegations. An example of such a policy, in the context of asylum seekers assistance, is: an operator with the role "coordinator" can register asylum seekers only if he is located within a 20 miles radius from the base camp, from 8am to 7pm.
Such policies are not supported by RBAC96, but can be specified using GemRBAC+CTX (and expressed using GemRBAC-DSL). However, they cannot be enforced because there is no enforcement mechanism for checking the complex AC policies that are supported by the GemRBAC+CTX model. Indeed, state-of-the-art enforcement mechanisms (such as [27, 29, 31, 33-35, 41, 47, 54] ) support AC models which are much less expressive than GemRBAC+CTX.
In this paper, we aim to fill this gap, by proposing an automated mechanism to enforce complex AC policies defined on top of the GemRBAC+CTX model and expressed in the GemRBAC-DSL language. We follow a model-driven engineering (MDE) [15] approach for enforcement based on standardized technologies such as the Unified Modelling Language (UML) and Object Constraint Language (OCL) [39] . More specifically, we reduce the problem of enforcing RBAC policies to the evaluation of the corresponding OCL constraints on an instance of the GemRBAC+CTX model. One advantage of such an approach is that the translation of GemRBAC-DSL policies into OCL constraints is already defined [7] : by adopting a model-driven approach, we can leverage the existing operationalization through OCL constraints of GemRBAC-DSL policies. Moreover, OCL constraint checking, given that OCL is a standard, is a consolidated technology implemented in mature tools, such as the constraint/query evaluator included in Eclipse OCL [19] .
Our model-driven enforcement approach not only enforces policies upon receiving a user request, but also provides a continuous enforcement after making an access decision, by handling events corresponding to changes in the RBAC configuration, to guarantee that a new configuration still fulfills the AC policies. The relevant access decisions are re-evaluated whenever a new change, from an AC point of view, occurs at the system state level (e.g., a user changes location, or a new user is authenticated). For instance, whenever a user changes her location, our enforcement mechanism checks whether her active roles should be deactivated (because of her new location). This enforcement is known as usage control [40] in the area of AC.
Although there have been a few proposals for model-driven enforcement [27, 33, 47] , they adopt an RBAC model much simpler than GemRBAC+CTX (and thus can deal with a limited set of AC policy types); moreover, they consider a subset of the AC requests/events supported by our approach. Furthermore, defining algorithms to precisely decide when and how to enforce OCL constraints corresponding to GemRBAC-DSL policies, as well as defining and engineering an architecture to integrate the constraint checker into a Web application, remain open questions that are addressed in this paper. We implemented our model-driven enforcement mechanism in a prototype, called MORRO. We integrated MORRO into a Web application developed by our industrial partner; following the guidelines of the XACML standard architecture [37] , our implementation includes a policy enforcement point (PEP) and a policy decision point (PDP). Although the proposed architecture has been designed based on our partner specifications, it can be generalized and integrated into other Web applications. We evaluated MORRO in terms of applicability and scalability. The evaluation results show that MORRO can be adopted without considerably impacting the overall performance (in terms of response time) of a Web application and that MORRO scales linearly with respect to the various parameters (e.g., the number of users and roles) characterizing an AC configuration. Overall, the results confirm the feasibility of using a model-driven approach to efficiently enforce complex RBAC policies.
To summarize, the main contributions of this paper are: 1) a model-driven approach for enforcing access control policies defined on top of the GemRBAC+CTX model, including algorithms specifying when and how the policy constraints are enforced; 2) an extensive empirical evaluation of our approach when integrated in an industrial system, to assess its performance and scalability.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background material. Section 3 illustrates our model-driven approach for enforcing GemRBAC+CTX policies. Section 4 describes the integration of the proposed approach into the architecture of an industrial Web application. Section 5 presents the empirical evaluation results. Section 6 reviews the state of the art. Section 7 concludes the paper.
BACKGROUND: THE GEMRBAC+CTX MODEL
The GemRBAC+CTX model [6, 8] is an extension of the RBAC96 model [43] that has been designed after surveying the various types of the authorization policies proposed in the literature. The rest of this section gives an overview of the main entities of GemR-BAC+CTX that are used in the subsequent sections. The GemRBAC+CTX model, defined as a UML class diagram, contains all the entities (User, Role, Session, Permission) of the original RBAC model. These entities are modeled as UML classes. A permission is represented as a set of operations that can be performed on a set of objects. The relations among these RBAC entities are modeled as UML associations. Each role is assigned to a set of permissions and to a set of users. A role can be inherited using a role hierarchy relation. The inheritance of role assignment relationships can be defined using a role hierarchy policy; a user (or a role) assigned to a role (respectively permission) must also be assigned to all its sub-roles (respectively sub-permissions) [43] .
A session is a mapping of one user to a subset of the roles that have been assigned to her; this mapping activates the role(s) for a certain user. However, in some systems only a subset of the assigned roles can be activated (e.g., because of the user's location), which are called enabled. Once a role is enabled, a user can request its activation within a session. Both role enabling and activation are modeled as UML associations between the Role and Session classes. Similarly, a permission is enabled if the user is allowed to perform its associated operations.
In addition to assignment relations, authorization policies are defined to restrict a user access. For instance, role and permission enabling/disabling can be regulated through precedence and contextual policies. Precedence policies define a precedence relationship between the enabling of a role and the activation of another role; for example, role student is enabled only if a supervisor role has been already activated. Contextual policies restrict a user to activate a role or perform an operation assigned to a permission of her role depending on her location [10] (location-based policy) and the current time [28] (time-based policy). The context (i.e., spatial and temporal information) is modeled with class RBACContext, which contains a TimeExpression and/or a Location. The GemRBAC+CTX model supports policies with fine-grained temporal and spatial expressions, such as "the first Monday of each month, from April 9, 2018 to January 11, 2019" and "the first floor of building A". A role is disabled if its corresponding contextual or a precedence policy is violated; a permission is disabled if its corresponding contextual policy is violated.
The GemRBAC+CTX model supports other types of authorization policies. Prerequisite policies define a precondition on user-torole assignment, allowing a user to acquire a role only if she is already assigned to another one [2, 43] . Prerequisite policies can also be defined at the permission level, allowing a role to acquire a permission only if this role is already assigned to another permission. Cardinality policies define a bound on the cardinality of role activation and assignment relations [1] ; e.g., a policy of type cardinality on role activation restricts a user from activating a number of roles that exceeds a given threshold. Dependency policies, complementary to the precedence ones, restrict the deactivation of a role if another role is still active [44] . Separation of duty policies (SoD) define a mutual exclusion relation among roles, permissions, or users; the entities involved in such relations are called conflicting; SoD policies can be either static or dynamic. Static SoD policies deal with user-to-role and role-to-permission assignments; for example, static SoD on conflicting roles specifies that the same user cannot be assigned to mutually exclusive roles. Dynamic SoD policies deal with user-role activation through a session; in this case, a user is allowed to acquire conflicting roles but she cannot activate them at the same time. Examples of this type of policy are dynamic SoD on conflicting roles (DCR) or users (DCU) and history-based (His) DSoD [6, 45] . Binding of Duty (BoD) policies are the dual of the SoD ones and define a correlation between a set of permissions, which are called bounded; they are usually used in the context of workflow systems, whose activities can be performed by different users with different roles. For example, in role-based BoD, the operations allowed by two or more permissions have to be performed by the same role [48] . To support history-based policies such as dynamic SoD or BoD, operations performed by a user on a given object in a certain context, are recorded and modeled as instances of class History. Delegation policies allow a user to delegate or transfer her role to another user [18, 54] . A delegation is partial if only a strict subset of the permissions associated to a role has been delegated; total otherwise. Revocation policies allow a user to revoke a delegated role [54] .
An instance of the GemRBAC+CTX model corresponds to a snapshot of the system state from an RBAC point of view, at a given time point. For example, the object diagram in figure 1 depicts an instance of the GemRBAC+CTX model that represents the following RBAC entities: two Users, u 1 and u 2 ; two Roles r 1 and r 2 ; two Permissions, p 1 and p 2 ; two Operations op 1 and op 2 ; four Objects, o 1 , o 2 , o 3 and o 4 . Permission p 1 is assigned to role r 1 and permission p 2 is assigned to role r 2 through role-permission assignment associations (RPA). Permission p 1 maps operations op 1 and op 2 to objects o 1 and o 2 ; similarly, permission p 2 maps operation op 1 to objects o 3 and o 4 . Moreover, both roles r 1 and r 2 are assigned both to user u 1 and to user u 2 through user-role assignment associations (URA). At the time when the snapshot has been taken, only user u 1 is connected through her session s 1 and has activated her assigned roles (r 1 and r 2 ) as shown by the role-activation associations (RA). The location of user u 1 is modeled with object cU 1 , an instance of the RBACContext class with a Location object pU 1 .
The policies supported by the GemRBAC+CTX model have been formalized as OCL constraints [6, 8] , to enable their operationalization. For instance, a Dynamic Separation of duty policy (DSoD) on conflicting roles, such as "a user can activate either role r 1 or r 2 ", is checked by verifying the following invariant (taken from [6] ) of the class Session, defined as an OCL constraint: Session, defined as an OCL constraint: The DSoD policy above can be checked on the model instance shown in figure 1 by evaluating the invariant DSoD on the Session object s 1 . In this case, the condition at lines 6-7 is true because both roles r 1 and r 2 are active. Therefore, we follow the then branch and evaluate the boolean expression at lines 8-9. This expression states that the list of active roles associated with session s1 should contain either r 1 or r 2 , but not both. Since both roles are active, the expression evaluates to false, meaning that the policy is violated.
The OCL formalization of the RBAC policies has been used to define the semantics of GemRBAC-DSL [7] , a high-level policy specification language built on top of GemRBAC+CTX. Each policy expressed in GemRBAC-DSL is mapped to an OCL constraint to operationalize its checking. For instance, the DSoD policy above can be expressed in GemRBAC-DSL as:
PL1-DSoD: conflicting-roles-activation r1 , r2 ;
We remark that GemRBAC-DSL does not express basic AC policies, i.e., those encoded as a) role-to-user and role-to-permission assignments, and as b) role-to-session activation or enabling relations; GemRBAC-DSL assumes that such policies are already defined at the model level as UML associations. 
MODEL-DRIVEN ENFORCEMENT OF COMPLEX POLICIES
The goal of this paper is to propose an automated mechanism to enforce access control policies defined on top of the GemRBAC+CTX model and expressed using the GemRBAC-DSL language. One basic idea to achieve this goal is to leverage the operationalization through OCL constraints of GemRBAC-DSL policies proposed in [7] , to define a model-driven enforcement approach. At the base of this approach there is the reduction of the problem of enforcing GemRBAC-DSL policies to the evaluation of the corresponding OCL constraints on an instance of GemRBAC+CTX (which captures the system state from an AC point of view). Adopting a model-driven approach for enforcing GemRBAC-DSL policies has two main advantages: 1) the possibility of building upon the existing translation of GemRBAC-DSL policies into OCL constraints, which is already optimized for efficient checking; 2) the reliance on OCL, which is a standard and for which there exists mature constraint checking technology. Nevertheless, putting such an approach in operation, requires to define algorithms to precisely decide when and how to enforce such constraints, as well as to outline an architecture that describes how to integrate the constraint checker into a Web application architecture: these are open questions that will be addressed by the coming sections. Figure 2 illustrates how our approach can be realized in an enforcement framework. Before deploying the application, we assume that a security admin has defined the initial system state from the point of view of AC. This means that the main RBAC entities (i.e., users, roles, permissions, operations and objects) of the system have been defined, together with their assignment relations (e.g., assignment of permissions to the various roles). These entities, representing the static RBAC view of the system, are captured in an instance of the GemRBAC+CTX model called initialSnap. We also assume that the security admin has defined the AC policies in GemRBAC-DSL. These policies are then translated into a set of OCL constraints (with respect to the GemRBAC+CTX model) using the translation defined in [7] .
After deployment, when the system is executing, the enforcement framework works as follows. Its inputs are:
• The set of OCL constraints corresponding to the GemRBAC-DSL policies defined for the system.
• A snapshot Snap of the system state from the point of view of AC, represented as a GemRBAC+CTX instance. This snapshot captures both the static RBAC view of the system and the dynamic RBAC view (e.g., active sessions, users' contexts); it is updated at run time as the AC configuration evolves. Notice that right after the start of the system execution, Snap corresponds to initialSnap.
• The actual AC request that has to be enforced. It contains (as instances of the corresponding classes of the GemRBAC+CTX model) the Object to access and the Operation to perform on it, such as "GET /url/to/resource".
The various steps of the enforcement process are shown in figure 2 and are marked with green dashed lines and circles. The main component of the enforcement framework is the SnapProcessor. Once the framework receives an AC request (step 1 ), the SnapProcessor first analyzes the request by checking whether the request is valid (step 2 ). For instance, a user cannot request to activate a role that is not assigned to her. In case the request is not valid, the access is denied and the access decision is returned (step 5 ).
Otherwise, if the request is valid, the SnapProcessor builds a new snapshot of the system state (step 3.a ), starting from the current state captured by the Snap. This new snapshot, called TargetSnap and also represented as an instance of the GemRBAC+CTX model, captures the next system state (from the point of view of AC) as if the AC request had been allowed. After creating the TargetSnap, the SnapProcessor selects-based on the type and the parameters of the AC request-the OCL constraints to evaluate (step 3.b ), corresponding to the policies to enforce; the policies selection follows the rules encoded in the top part of table 1. The selected OCL constraints are evaluated by an OCL checker (step 4 ). In this way, making an access decision for an AC request (step 5 ) is equivalent to verifying whether the TargetSnap satisfies the OCL constraints corresponding to the policies to enforce. If the constraints evaluate to true, it means that the AC request can be allowed, since it will not violate any policy. On the contrary, when the constraints evaluate to false, it means that allowing the request would violate one or more of the policies defined for the system.
Our approach adopts also the usage control [40] concept for AC, which aims to revise AC decisions (by re-enforcing AC policies) when a new update, from the point of view of AC, occurs at the system level. For instance, whenever a user changes her location, our enforcement mechanism re-evaluates the (OCL constraints corresponding to the) location-based policies for this user, to check 
Making Access Decisions for AC Requests
The procedure for enforcing policies upon receiving an AC request is shown in algorithm 1. It takes as input an AC request a, a snapshot Snap corresponding to the system state (from the point of view of AC) at the time of the request, and the list P of policies defined for the system; it returns a tuple, containing the access decision d (a boolean value, with true corresponding to "allow" and false to "deny") and a snapshot TargetSnap (an instance of GemRBAC+CTX corresponding to the new system state as if the request had been authorized). Besides variables d and TargetSnap, the procedure uses an auxiliary variable PLC, representing the list of policies to check for a specific type of the AC request and initialized to an empty list. Both variables TargetSnap and d are initialized to null. Our approach considers AC requests of type: role activation, access to a resource, role delegation, role revocation, and administrative operation (i.e., assigning a role to a user or to a permission).
First, the SnapProcessor checks the validity of the request by calling operation validateRequest (line 2, corresponding to step 2 in figure 2). The validity is determined based on the type of the AC request as follows. In case of a role activation, the request is valid if the role to activate is already enabled for the user who made the request. In case of an access to a resource, the requested permission (e.g., p) should be assigned to an active role r in the current session of the user who made the request and should be enabled; if the user who made the request acquired role r through a delegation, this delegation should include permission p. In case of a role delegation, the role being delegated should be assigned to the user who made the request and not assigned to the user who will receive the delegation. In case of an administrative operation, the requested user (respectively, permission) should not belong to the list of users (respectively, permissions) assigned to the role indicated in the request.
If the AC request a is not valid, the SnapProcessor sets the access decision d to false (line 5). Otherwise, the SnapProcessor builds the TargetSnap by calling operation buildTargetSnap (line 3, corresponding to step 3.a in figure 2 ). This operation takes as input the AC request a and the snapshot Snap; its behavior depends on the type of the AC request:
• Role activation. We consider a request of the form "user u 1 requesting to activate role r 1 ". First, we remove role r 1 from the list of enabled roles. Then, we add it to the list of active roles for user u 1 ; if a precedence policy is specified for role r 1 , the SnapProcessor enables the list of roles which should be enabled for other users, according to the precedence relation.
• Access to a resource. We consider a request of the form user "u 1 with role r 1 requesting to perform operation op 1 on object o 1 ". To build TargetSnap, we add a new instance of type History to the current Snap. This instance records that user u 1 , while having role r 1 , performed operation op 1 on object o 1 through permission p 1 .
• Role delegation. We consider a request of the form "user u 1 requesting to delegate her role r 1 to user u 2 ". The TargetSnap is obtained by adding role r 1 to the list of delegated roles for user u 2 and creating a new instance of class Delegation.
• Role revocation. We consider a request of the form "user u 1 requesting to revoke delegation d 1 "; we also assume that user u 2 acquired role r 2 through delegation d 1 (originated from u 1 ). We build the TargetSnap by removing role r 2 from the list of delegated roles assigned to user u 2 , marking delegation d 1 as revoked, and recording the revoking user (u 1 ).
• Administrative operation. We consider a request of the form "admin requesting to assign role r 1 to user u 1 " or "'admin requesting to assign role r 1 to permission p 1 ". The SnapProcessor builds the TargetSnap by adding the appropriate assignment relation, i.e a roleto-user assignment or a role-to-permission assignment relation.
After building the TargetSnap, the SnapProcessor extracts the list PLC of policies to check from the system policies list P by calling operation selectPolicies (line 4, corresponding to step 3.b in figure 2 ). This operation determines the list of policies to check based on the type (i.e., according to table 1) and the parameters of the request. For instance, in case of an AC request of type role activation, the list PLC will contain all the policies in P whose type is indicated in row RA (i.e., AC, DCR, DCU), and whose parameters match at least one of the request parameters (i.e., the user who made the request and the role to activate).
Then, if the access decision d has not been set yet (i.e., it is null), the algorithm invokes the OCL checker (operation check at line 6, corresponding to step 4 in figure 2 ). This operation evaluates, on the TargetSnap, the OCL constraints corresponding to the policies in PLC; the result of the evaluation will contain the access decision. The algorithm ends by returning the tuple with both the access decision d and the new system state TargetSnap (step 5 in figure 2 ). We recall that when the access is denied TargetSnap will be null.
Handling Notifications for AC Events
The procedure for updating the system state captured by the Snap and enforcing policies upon receiving a notification for an AC event is shown in algorithm 2. It takes as input an AC event e, a snapshot Snap corresponding to the system state (from the point of view of AC) at the time of the notification, and the list of policies P defined for the system; it returns a snapshot USnap, which is an instance of the GemRBAC+CTX model corresponding to the updated system state. Besides variable USnap (initialized to null), the procedure uses an auxiliary variable PLC, representing the list of policies to check for a specific type of event and initialized to an empty list. Our approach considers events of type user authentication, user's location change, and user disconnection.
Upon receiving an event notification, the SnapProcessor first updates the system state according to the received event by calling operation updateState (line 2, corresponding to step 2.a in figure 2). This operation takes as input the received AC event e and the current system state captured by the Snap; it returns the updated state in USnap. The behavior of operation update depends on the type of the event e:
• The user authentication event corresponds to the case of a user logging in the system. We assume that the enforcement framework receives the notification from an authentication server, which checks the user credentials and allows her login. In this case, we update the state by adding a new instance of class Session for the authenticated user, updating the user's location, and enabling, within the newly added session, all the roles assigned to the user.
• The user's location change event corresponds to the case of a connected user changing her location. We assume that a geolocalization server keeps track of the user position; this server sends a notification to the enforcement framework whenever a connected user changes her location. In this case, the state is updated by updating the user's location.
• The user disconnection event corresponds to the case when a user is experiencing network issues. We assume that the authentication server periodically checks for the online status of a user and sends a notification to the enforcement framework when it detects that the user is offline 1 . In this case, we update the state by removing the session of the disconnected user.
Afterwards, the SnapProcessor extracts the list PLC of policies to check from the system policies list P, by calling operation select-Policies (line 3, corresponding to step 2.b in figure 2 ). This operation determines the list of policies to check based on the type (according to table 1) and the parameters of the received event notification. For instance, in case of a user authentication event, the list PLC will contain all the policies in P whose type is indicated in row UA (i.e., CT, CL), and whose parameters match at least 1 The case of a user sending a log out request to the authentication server is treated by forwarding the request to the enforcement mechanism, which is then processed as explained in section 3.1. one of the notification parameters. Then, for each policy p in PLC, the SnapProcessor invokes the OCL checker (operation check at line 5, corresponding to step 3 in figure 2), to evaluate, on the USnap, the OCL constraint(s) corresponding to p. If the result of the evaluation is false, it means that the new system state (as determined in response to the event e) violates policy p. Applying the usage control concept, the SnapProcessor amends the USnap, by calling operation rectify (line 6, corresponding to step 4 in figure 2) ; the behavior of this operation depends on the type of the event e:
• User authentication. We consider a notification of the form {u 1 , s 1 , loc}, where u 1 is the user being authenticated, s 1 is the token representing the user's session, loc is the current position of the user. For each role r enabled for user u 1 in session s 1 , the SnapProcessor amends USnap by disabling role r in session s 1 .
• User's location change. We consider a notification of the form {u 1 , loc 1 , loc 2 }, where u 1 denotes the user and loc 1 and loc 2 correspond, respectively, to the previous and the new position of user u 1 . For each role r assigned to user u 1 , the SnapProcessor amends USnap according to the state of role r : if it is enabled (respectively, active), the SnapProcessor will disable (respectively, deactivate) it from all the sessions of user u 1 .
• User disconnection. We consider a notification of the form {u 1 , s 1 }, where u 1 is the user being authenticated and s 1 is the token representing the user's session. For each role r assigned to user u 1 , the SnapProcessor amends USnap by disabling and deactivating role r 1 from all sessions in the system. The algorithm ends by returning USnap (step 5 in figure 2 ).
RUN-TIME ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION
We have integrated the enforcement framework presented in section 3 into the architecture of a Web application developed by our partner. This architecture includes: a) a Web application and a set of micro-services, which expose resources accessible through the web interface; b) a geo-localization server, which records the users' position; and c) an authentication server, for authenticating users based on their credentials. To integrate our enforcement framework, we have added two new components to this architecture: an authorization server and a proxy. These components follows the guidelines of the XACML standard architecture [37] , which prescribes to use two components: a policy enforcement point (PEP) and a policy decision point (PDP). In this standard architecture, a user AC request is intercepted by the PEP, which will transform it into an XACML request and forward it to the PDP; the latter evaluates the request based on the authorization policies. In our case, the PEP is the proxy, while the PDP is the authorization server. The authorization server integrates the Snap-Processor and the OCL Checker shown in figure 2; it receives AC requests and notification of AC events and enforces the policies as described in section 3, making sure that only authorized users can access the resources exposed by the set of micro-services. The proxy is a gateway that intercepts user AC requests: it first forwards them to the authorization server, which makes an access decision that is returned to the proxy; if the access decision is "allow" the proxy forwards the original user request to the corresponding micro-service. In addition, we have included a storage component for the access control data, which contains the snapshot Snap (given in input to and updated by the authorization server) and the GemRBAC+CTX policies to enforce.
Although the resulting enforcement architecture has been designed based on the architectural specifications provided by our industrial partner, it can be generalized and integrated into other Web applications. More specifically, the proxy can be integrated seamlessly within existing load balancers, which are very common in Web applications [16] ; the authorization server and the storage are additional components that can be deployed on any Web application server.
Implementation. The core of our framework is a component, called MORRO (MOdel-driven fRamework for Run-time enforcement of RBAC pOlicies), and includes the authorization server and the proxy. MORRO has been implemented in Java with a microservice based architecture using the SpringBoot [49] framework and the ZuuL proxy v.1.2.7 [36] . The implementation of the authorization server uses the Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF) and Eclipse OCL v.5.2 [19] . The Snap is expressed as an Ecore [20] model.
EVALUATION
In this section we report on the evaluation of MORRO when deployed in a real Web application, with a complex AC configuration. We assess the efficiency and applicability of MORRO by answering the following research questions:
RQ1: How long does the authorization server in MORRO take to process AC requests/events, when deployed on a real industrial system, under various AC configurations? RQ2: How do the access decision time and the AC event processing time of the authorization server in MORRO scale with respect to changes of the various parameters potentially affecting the performance of an AC configuration?
RQ3: What is the communication overhead between the authorization server and the proxy in case of an AC request?
Evaluation Settings
We considered a real AC configuration used by our industrial partner, consisting of 1648 users, 396 roles, 53 permissions, 300 objects and 4 operations (create, read, update, and delete). We defined a set of GemRBAC-DSL policies in collaboration with the security engineers of our partner. We then determined the types of policies used in the specification and, for each type, we considered a representative example to answer the research questions mentioned above. To enable MORRO to enforce them, we used the mapping of these policies to OCL constraints we previously proposed in [6, 8] .
We deployed MORRO onto a micro-service-based architecture provided by our industrial partner. This architecture was running on a development machine equipped with a dual CPU Intel Xeon E5-2640 v2 2 GHz and 24 GB of memory; we used this machine to run all the experiments. All time measurement were performed by invoking the System.nanoTime() method of the standard Java library, version 1.8.
Due to space reasons, in the following we present only a summary of the evaluation results. We refer to the first author's PhD thesis [5, chapter III] for a complete description of the policies used in the evaluation and for the detailed experimental results.
Performance on an Industrial System
Methodology. To address RQ1, we measured the time taken by the authorization server in MORRO to process different types of AC requests and events. More specifically, in case of an AC request we measured the access decision time, i.e., the time difference from the time the authorization server receives the request to the time it yields an access decision. In case of an AC event, we measured the execution time needed to update the current system state (Snap), i.e., the time difference from the time the authorization server receives a notification for an AC event until the time it updates the current system state. Based on the AC configuration of the test application defined by our industrial partner, we generated two types of AC requests and two types of AC events. For each type of request (respectively, event) the access decision time (respectively, execution time) was assessed both on a basic configuration-i.e., an AC configuration that is only determined by role assignment and activation relations-and on configurations that add to the basic configuration other policies to be checked. The types of requests and events generated are:
• Access to a resource. We consider two scenarios: 1) when the role of the user making the request has been assigned and 2) when a subset of the permissions assigned to this role has been delegated. As for the configurations, in addition to the basic one, we use one with a history-based DSoD policy and another with a BoD policy.
• Role activation. The additional configurations use the cardinality on role activation and the DCR policies.
• User authentication. We consider two scenarios, in which we distinguish whether the user's position is known or not. The additional configurations use precedence, location-based, and timebased policies.
• User's location change. We consider one additional configuration with a location-based policy. For all configurations we considered the worst-case scenario, with the maximum allowed value for each system parameter (e.g., maximum number of roles assigned to a user).
Since MORRO runs on a Java-based environment, the measurements of the running time are affected by various factors [23] . Furthermore, the network-based communication between the proxy and the authorization server introduces some noise. For these reasons, when measuring the access decision time for AC requests, we sent ten AC requests, discarded the first one (since it is affected by the loading time of the run-time libraries), and measured the average value over checking the nine subsequent requests. As for measuring the execution time for processing AC events, we were able to achieve stable results by sending only five notifications. As above, since the first value is affected by the loading of the runtime libraries, we discarded it and measured the average value over processing the four subsequent notifications. In both cases, to keep the same instance over the different runs, we designed the (initial) AC configuration of the system such that the OCL checker yields false (denying the access request).
Results. We answer RQ1 by summarizing the main results. The access decision time within the authorization server is less than 64 ms; the highest value is obtained while evaluating an AC request of type access to a resource for a configuration with a history-based DSoD policy in a role delegation scenario. This value has to be analyzed in the context of Web applications which are accessed by users from a browser. In modern Web applications, the complexity of each single Web page requires a relatively high network time (i.e., the time needed by a browser to fetch all resources to be displayed on a page); for example, a web page from Wikipedia requires on average 1880 ms of networking time [17] . Under this scenario, a maximum overhead of 64 ms due to the AC enforcement framework would correspond to less than 4% increase over the total networking time, which is quite affordable in practice.
The execution time for processing a notification of an AC event is less than 512 ms; the highest value is obtained while evaluating an AC request of type user authentication for a configuration with a precedence policy considering the case when the user position is known. This value has also to be interpreted in the context of Web applications. In such a context, an AC event is triggered by a user action and its processing should be completed before the next user request, so that the latter can be evaluated on the updated system data (as modified by the AC event). Hence, the execution time for processing the notification of an AC event should be less than the time between the completion of a user request and the start of a new one (i.e., the think time). TCP-W [51] , a common benchmark for Web applications, considers an average think time of 7 s; the maximum value for the execution time in our system (512 ms) is well below this threshold.
Scalability
Methodology. To answer RQ2, we evaluated the scalability of the authorization server. Scalability is concerned with analyzing the change in access decision time (and AC event execution time) as parameters increase in value, with respect to different scenarios and configurations. Our goal is to use such information to draw conclusions on how our solution is likely to tackle even more complex AC situations.
We considered the same AC requests and AC events used to answer RQ1, and the corresponding scenarios and configurations. To assess the effect of a parameter, we varied it while keeping all the other relevant system parameters constant. The parameter varied either between a range of values with a certain step increment, or through a set of predefined values; the latter case occurred for parameters that affect the evaluation of spatial and temporal policies. The snapshots of the system state corresponding to all these configurations were generated using an internally developed, parametrized generator. In each experimental run, we sent an AC request or an AC event notification. In the case of AC requests, we measured the access decision time; in the case of AC events, we measured the execution time for processing the event. In both cases, we measured these values following the same procedure described in the answer to RQ1.
Results. For space reasons, here we only present the results corresponding to one type of AC request and to one type of AC event, on a specific configuration. Table 2 reports the evaluation results for an AC request of type access to a resource (AR) and for an AC event of type user authentication (UA). We consider 1) an AC request of the form "u 1 with role r 1 in session s 1 requesting to perform operation op 1 on object o 1 ", on a configuration with a history-based DSoD policy (His), for both The answer to RQ2 is that the access decision time and the execution time for processing a notification of an AC event are either linear with respect to the parameters of the various configurations or almost constant (i.e., there is no much variation across runs, with low SD). These trends can be explained in terms of the operations called in the OCL constraints (see [6, 8] ) evaluated for each policy. For example, for the first configuration ("AC-His-RLA") with parameter "b" (the number of active roles in session s 1 ), the access decision time is almost constant, i.e., it does not depend on parameter "b": this is due to the definition (in [6] ) of the OCL constraint corresponding to the history-based DSoD policy), in which checking whether both conflicting roles are active in session s 1 is performed in a constant time. Similar trends can be observed for the other configurations, for each type of AC request/event. Overall, these results imply that our solution is applicable for even more challenging AC situations with larger numbers of sessions, roles, and permissions.
The highest value for the access decision time we measured was 148 ms, in the case of a request of type access to a resource, in a configuration with a His policy, with a role delegation scenario, with 10K objects within the set of logs. Along the lines of the discussion for RQ1, such value would represent an 8% overhead with respect to the average networking time (see [17] ) for fetching a complex Web page. Such an overhead is still acceptable when enforcing AC policies in large systems.
The highest value for the execution time we measured was 2017 ms, in the case of an AC event of type user authentication, in a configuration with a precedence policy, with 25K active sessions, with a known user location. As also discussed for RQ1, this value would still be below the think time threshold (7 s) provided by the TCP-W [51] benchmark.
Overhead of the Communication between the Authorization Service and the Proxy
Methodology. To address RQ3, we measured the communication overhead between the authorization service and the proxy, i.e., the time taken to dispatch an authorization request from the proxy to the authorization server, plus the time to propagate the access decision from the authorization server back to the proxy. We computed this overhead as the difference between the access decision time measured within the proxy and the access decision time measured within the authorization server; the access decision time within the proxy is the difference between the time instant at which the proxy receives an AC request from the user and the time instant at which the proxy receives an access decision for that request from the authorization server. We measured this difference for all the requests/events, scenarios and configurations mentioned in section 5.2.
Results. The answer to RQ3 is that the overall overhead of the communication between the authorization service and the proxy is less than 60 ms. When considering both the access decision time within the authorization server and the communication overhead between the authorization server and the proxy, the most taxing AC request is one of type access to a resource, for a configuration with a "His" policy, with an access decision time within the proxy of 107 ms. Along the lines of the discussion for RQ1, such value would represent less than 6% of the average networking time (see [17] ) for fetching a complex Web page. Furthermore, this value is far below the threshold (200 ms) indicated in the requirements specifications of the Web application developed by our industrial partner.
RELATED WORK
This work leverages our previous work on modeling and specifying complex RBAC policies using the GemRBAC+CTX model [6, 8] and the GemRBAC-DSL language [7] , including the operationalization of RBAC policies as OCL constraints. This paper complements and advances our previous work by providing an approach for the enforcement of RBAC policies, which includes the description of algorithms specifying when and how the policy constraints are en- forced, the definition and engineering of an architecture to integrate the constraint checker into a Web application, and an empirical evaluation of the performance and scalability of the approach when integrated into an industrial system. A work very close to our contribution has been proposed by Sohr et al. [47] , which implements the PDP as a model-driven authorization engine, in the context of Web services. RBAC policies are expressed as OCL contraints using the USE tool, a validation tool for UML models and OCL constraints. Similar to MORRO, to make an access decision, the authorization engine checks whether the system state, represented as an UML object diagram, satisfies the RBAC policies expressed as OCL constraints. The main difference is that this work is based on the standard RBAC96 model, which supports a limited subset of the policies that can be specified in GemRBAC+CTX (and enforced by our approach). More precisely, the proposed enforcement mechanism supports only cardinality, prerequisite, and history-based SoD. Moreover, contextual policies assume that the context is represented symbolically: i.e., fine-grained spatial (e.g., with relative locations) and temporal (e.g., with intervals) policies are not supported. Because of these intrinsic limitations in the underlying model, the enforcement mechanism can deal with only a subset of the AC requests (access to a resource, role activation, and administrative operation) and events (user authentication) supported by MORRO. Furthermore, the approach presented in reference [47] does not support usage control.
Other model-driven approaches for policy enforcement have been presented in [27, 33] . In the approach by Hummer et al. [27] , RBAC policies are written in a domain-specific language based on UML activity diagrams and mapped to Business Process Execution Language for Web services (WS-BPEL) specifications to be enforced at run time; however, this work supports only separation of duty and binding of duty policies. The work by Martinez et al. [33] deals with the generation of a PDP infrastructure from a specification written in a policy language, using ATL model transformations. A limitation shared by these model-driven approaches is that RBAC policies are only enforced as a response to a user AC request of type role activation or access to a resource. Similarly, the work by Zhang et al. [54] propose an enforcement framework that supports only delegation and revocation policies.
Recent work by Margheri et al. [31] proposes a framework for the specification, analysis, and enforcement of ABAC [25] (attributebased access control) policies; RBAC can be seen as a specific case of ABAC, where role is one of the attributes. In this work, both AC requests and policies are expressed in a high-level language called FACPL; they are then translated into constraints to be solved using an SMT solver. Although this approach is at a high level conceptually similar to ours (both approaches formalize the semantics of AC policies as constraints, either in OCL or in SMT-LIB), the underlying AC models are different. As a consequence, the types of requests and events upon which the policies are enforced are also different: the FACPL-based framework only supports AC requests of type access to a resource and does not support the concept of usage control. Furthermore, its empirical evaluation considered only one small case study and randomly generated policies, assessing scalability only in terms of the number of attributes.
Other proposals deal with the generation of aspects from policy specifications; the generated aspects are inserted into the application to be executed at run time. Mourad et al. [34] propose the use of BPEL aspects to enforce AC policies in the context of web service composition. Kallel et al. [29] generate enforcement aspects in As-pectJ from an RBAC specification written in TemporalZ. Mariscal et al. [41] introduce a new UML artifact, called role-slice, which is used to generated aspects. Mustafa et al. [35] propose an authorization engine in which policies written in a Z specification are translated into a Java Modeling Language (JML) specification to be checked by a JML runtime assertion checker.
A limitation shared by all approaches mentioned above is that they do not adopt the usage control concept, meaning that the proposed enforcement mechanisms cannot react to changes in the RBAC configuration.
Other proposals deal with context-based usage control in RBAC. Kirkpatrick et al. [30] propose a proximity-based enforcement mechanism for the GEO-RBAC [10] model using the XACML architecture. However, this work does not consider role activation as a separate request; when submitting a request to access a resource, the user has to specify the role to activate. Although the proposed mechanism incorporates usage control, only policies supported by the GEO-RBAC model, i.e., location-based and dynamic SoD on conflicting roles, are enforced. An authorization framework for enforcing timebased policies, based on the X-GTRBAC language and its model GTRBAC [28] has been proposed by Bhatti et al. [12] . Policies written in the X-GTRBAC language are enforced using a Java-based GUI application. Ben David et al. [4] propose a run-time enforcement mechanism composed of a monitor and a change analyzer. Both the running system and the RBAC policies are expressed using the models@runtime paradigm [13] as a running architecture model. By observing the system behavior, the monitor sends a notification to the change analyzer whenever a change is detected. Upon this notification, the change analyzer builds a target architecture model that will be used to evaluate the RBAC policies. This work is similar to our enforcement approach as they build a target model to enforce the RBAC policies. However, this approach was not implemented and only assignment and activation relations are supported. Table 3 summarizes to which extent the policy enforcement approaches discussed above support the various AC requests/events presented in section 3. As one can see, the MORRO framework proposed in this paper is the only one that supports all of them.
In addition, none of the approaches discussed above provides a full support for the comprehensive set of authorization policies captured by GemRBAC+CTX. Although some approches [12, 27, 29, 30, 33-35, 41, 47, 54] provide a prototype implementation of their enforcement mechanisms, none of these implementations are available for a performance comparison; the only exception is the FACPL framework [31] that, however, supports a different AC model. Furthermore, only few of the aforementioned approaches [27, 31, 33, 47] provide an empirical evaluation assessing the access decision time; however, we could not compare these approaches with ours, since the underlying RBAC models and the application contexts are different.
While in this paper we have addressed the problem of enforcing AC policies, there is a series of work, orthogonal to ours, that focuses on testing and static verification of AC policies (and, in some cases, their implementation), using various techniques such as mutation testing [11, 32] , model-based testing [53] , model checking [21, 55] , SAT solving [26] , theorem proving [14] , and static analysis [50] .
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we presented a model-driven enforcement framework for policies defined on top of a comprehensive role-based access control model (GemRBAC+CTX), which leverages the operationalization of the access control policies as OCL constraints. We reduce the problem of making an access decision to checking whether a system state (from an RBAC point of view) expressed as an instance of the GemRBAC+CTX model satisfies the OCL constraints corresponding to the RBAC policies to be enforced. Policies are enforced both when an AC request is made and when an AC event is triggered; we provide the checking algorithms for both cases. We implemented the core of our enforcement framework in a tool called MORRO and provided an integration strategy for a typical industrial Web application, following the guidelines of the XACML standard architecture. The evaluation results show that MORRO can be adopted without considerably impacting the response time of a Web application and that MORRO scales linearly with respect to the various parameters characterizing an AC configuration. Overall, the results confirm the feasibility of using a model-driven approach to efficiently enforce complex RBAC policies.
Although we considered the GemRBAC+CTX model in the application of our approach, the latter is generic and does not depend on GemRBAC+CTX: it can be applied to any other AC model that can be expressed in UML and whose policies can be expressed in OCL. As part of future work, we plan to assess the end-to-end performance of a system integrating MORRO under different evaluation settings, such as a production configuration deployed on an elastic cloud infrastructure. We also plan to optimize MORRO in terms of time efficiency by adopting cache-based enforcement [24, 52] , and in terms of space efficiency, by adopting the Kevoree Modeling Framework (KMF) [22] , which is optimized for manipulating models at run time on large distributed systems.
